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Prescriptions at a Price: America's
Opioid Crisis and the Increasing Toll
on Drug Record Privacy
ABSTRACT
How should the US Constitution govern patient privacy in the
face of a public health emergency? Declaring the United States' opioid
crisis as a public health emergency may put the already-compromised
integrity of drug record privacy at higher risk by virtue of emerging
administrative responses, existing Supreme Court precedent, and
acquiescent state laws. The White House convened a summit on opioids
where the then- US attorney general discussed law enforcement responses
to the crisis. Although the Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court's third-party
doctrine generally grants state and federal actors access to records
released to third parties. Moreover, the Court has not clearly defined
society's "reasonable xpectation of privacy," especially in the context of
a public health emergency in the digital age. Some states have further
compromised prescription record privacy by creating prescription drug
monitoring programs that acquiesce to government. concerns. If a
warrantless earch of a state-managed monitoring program takes place
during a public health emergency, government actors should not be
permitted to circumvent privacy safeguards established by state and
constitutional law. Rather, legislatures and courts should protect
prescription drug records under the Fourth Amendment and through
redaction initiatives that keep private and sensitive information safe.
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"The Decade of Pain Control" began nearly twenty years ago
when Congress reauthorized federal programs researching the effects
of pain management.' Opioids are a type of pain management
substance, which include a variety of drugs with similar chemical
compositions.2 Some opioids, like heroin and fentanyl, are illegal
substances.3 Others-including oxycodone, hydrocodone, codeine, and
morphine-are commonly prescribed pain relievers.4 All opioids have
the effect of dulling a user's perception of pain and creating feelings of
euphoria.5
Over the past decade, the debate concerning the role of opioid
therapy in pain control management has intensified.6 While the
general consensus among pain management specialists supports the
1. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1603,
114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 22
U.S.C.) ("The calendar decade beginning January 1, 2001, is designated as the 'Decade of Pain
Control and Research."').
2. See Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Controlled Substances
Act), Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971); Jami Vigil,
Prescription Opioid Drug Misuse: Promoting Treatment in Drug Court, 46 COLO. LAW. 28, 28
(2017).
3. See Vigil, supra note 2, at 28.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Clinicians'
Perspective, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 296, 296 (1996); White House Convenes Summit on Opioids,
NPR (Mar. 1, 2018, 5:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/01/589802149/white-house-convenes-
summit-on-opioids [https://perma.cclBN6N-CHWR].
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belief that opioids can effectively treat chronic pain without significant
adverse effects, some specialists argue that opioid therapy gives way to
tolerance development, side effects, and addiction.7
Nearly two decades after Congress reauthorized federal
programs researching pain management, roughly 64,000 people died
from drug overdoses-42,000 of those deaths were caused by opioids.9
This problem is only getting worse: evidence suggests that the drug
overdose death rate continued to rise in 2017.10 Moreover, death is not
the only matter of concern in the opioid epidemic." The problem also
affects over two million Americans who are dependent on opioids and
the ninety-five million Americans who used prescription painkillers in
the past year.12
The proffered causes of this epidemic are plenty.13 Some suggest
that medical practitioners overprescribe opioids, often giving patients
more pills or higher dosages than necessary.14 Others trace the issue to
7. See Portenoy, supra note 6, at 296.
8 See Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (June
5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-overdose-
deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html [https://perma.cc/KQ72-EV9N].
9. See Puja Seth et al., Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and
Psychostimulants - United States, 2015-2016, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 349, 350-
51 (2018). Figures vary according to what substances tudies include as "opioids" in their data
sets. Compare id. at 349-50 (including prescription opioids, heroin, and fentanyl in opioid overdose
estimate), with Overdose Death Rates, NATL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Aug. 2018),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
[https://perma.cclH4X8-2A47] (including fentanyl and synthetic opioids, or fentanyl analogs, in
opioid overdose estimate).
10. See Katz, supra note 8.
11. See id.; Underlying Cause of Death, 1999-2016 Results, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icdlO.html fhttps://perma.cc/ADC4-QMN9] (last
visited Feb. 22, 2017) (listing the following nine diagnosis codes under the general category of
"mental and behavioural disorders due to opioids": (1) acute intoxication, (2) harmful use, (3)
dependence syndrome, (4) withdrawal state, (5) withdrawal state with delirium, (6) psychotic
disorder, (7) amnesic syndrome, (8) residual and late-onset psychotic disorder, and (9) an
"unspecified" catch-all).
12. See Katz, supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., Lauren Rousseau & I. Eric Nordan, Tug v. Mingo: Let the Plaintiffs Sue-
Opioid Addiction, the Wrongful Conduct Rule, and the Culpability Exception, 34 W. MICH. U.
COOLEY L. REV. 33, 38 (2017).
14. See, e.g., Lenny Bernstein, Surgeons Were Told to Stop Prescribing So Many
Painkillers. The Results Were Remarkable, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/201 7/03/07/surgeons-were-told-to-stop-
prescribing-so-many-painkillers-the-results-were-remarkable/?utm-term=.ef4d6f9c8fe31
[https://perma.cc/8QS3-SHYS]; President Donald Trump Speaks at White House Opioid Summit -
March 1, 2018 | NBC News, YOUTUBE, 1:27:46-51 (Mar. 1, 2018), https://youtu.be/wuQ4arqP4Zo
[https://perma.cc/3BLM-4U5L] (then-US Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated that "[a]s much as
80 percent of addictions today start with prescription drugs."). But see Sally Satel, The Myth of
What's Driving the Opioid Crisis, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/21/the-myth-of-the-roots-of-the-opioid-crisis-
217034 [https://perma.cc/QX27-63N9] (arguing that physician-prescribed opioids do not produce
high rates of addiction).
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medical school training, implicit physician biases, and threats of
medical malpractice liability. 15 Another possible cause involves patient
efforts to misrepresent hemselves and deceive medical practitioners in
order to obtain opioids to resell, abuse, or stockpile for emergencies.16
Sources unrelated to prescribing practices-such as military service,
individual unemployment, and economic recessions-are also said to
contribute to the opioid crisis.17  More recently, reports have
characterized the opioid epidemic as a "tech problem."18
Considering the pervasive and devastating effects of the opioid
crisis, solving the crisis has proven to be just as complicated as the issue
itself.19 The federal government and most states have taken varying
15. See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can
Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM.
J.L. & MED. 7, 13 (2016); Soumya Karlamangla, California's Opioid Death Rate Is Among the
Nation's Lowest. Experts Aren't Sure Why, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017, 11:20 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/health/la-me-In-california-opioids-20171026-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/6XKT-YJ75] ("[Californians] 'may have been sheltered from the higher
prescribing habits of rural areas [because] ... doctors are less likely to address complaints of pain
from nonwhite patients, which would mean fewer opioid prescriptions per capita in diverse places
such as Los Angeles."); Ilana Kowarski, Opioid Crisis Spurs Change at Medical Schools, U.S. NEWS
(Oct. 19, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-medical-
schools/articles/2017- 10-1 9/opioid-crisis-spurs-change-at-medical-schools
[https://perma.cc/BU8M-CJN8].
16. See, e.g., Dineen & Dubois, supra note 15, at 16; Maia Szalavitz, Opioid Addiction Is
a Huge Problem, but Pain Prescriptions Are Not the Cause, SCl. AM. (May 10, 2016),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/opioid-addiction-is-a-huge-problem-but-
pain-prescriptions-are-not-the-cause/ [https://perma.cc/3NTA-LZGC] ("According to the large,
annually repeated and representative National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 75 percent of all
opioid misuse starts with people using medication that wasn't prescribed for them-obtained from
a friend, family member or dealer.").
17. See Sarah Childress, Veterans Face Greater Risks Amid Opioid Crisis, PBS (Mar. 28,
2016), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/veterans-face-greater-risks-amid-opioid-crisis/
[https://perma.ce/2NC9-QSGB]; Death, Sex & Money: I Can't Fix It: A First Responder and Heroin,
NEW YORK PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/mark-strickland-
death-sex-money?tab-transcript [https://perma.cc/X6Q9-RC9A]; Olga Khazan, How Job Loss Can
Lead to Drug Use, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/healtiarchive/2017/07/how-job-loss-can-lead-to-drug-use/534087/
[https://perma.ccfHN34-5HMW].
18. See, e.g., Note to Self: Is the Opioid Epidemic a Tech Problem?, NEW YORK PUBLIC
RADIO (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/dark-web-nick-bilton ("[Ylou can draw a
line from [the Dark Web,] . . . [an] easy-to-access, secretive place on the internet, straight to real
life, and the drug-specifically opioid-epidemic . . . .") The Author of this Note acknowledges the
complex and multifaceted nature of the opioid crisis. See Word News Roundup: 09/21, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 21, 2018), http://audio.cbsradionewsfeed.com/2018/09/21/08/0921WNR 1801_4212128.mp3
("[A] new study in the midst of an opioid crisis says this about addiction and overdose deaths: it's
complicated. . . . There are few trends, and it's not just prescription opioids killing people. . . .
[W]hile the death rate from overdoses has been climbing for decades, the elements of where, who,
and the drugs of choice are constantly shifting."). This Note specifically focuses on the regulation
of prescription opioids vis-A-vis prescription drug monitoring programs. See infra Parts II, III.
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012); Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a
Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARv. L. & POLY REV. 463, 473-74 (2017); Elizabeth Landers,
Trump Advocates 'The Ultimate Penalty' for Drug Dealers During Opioid Summit, CNN (Mar. 1,
2018, 5:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/01/politics/donald-trump-drug-dealers-
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approaches to address the crisis.20 Lost in the public discourse over the
opioid crisis, however, are the constitutional implications concerning
patient privacy.21 For example, a federal court recently held that a
federal agency did not need a warrant to access a state-managed
controlled substance database-despite the Fourth Amendment's
warrant clause and a state law that required all officials to obtain a
valid search warrant before accessing the database.22
This Note considers these issues and makes legal
recommendations that involve state legislatures, lower courts, and the
US Supreme Court. Part I reviews the Fourth Amendment and court
decisions regarding warrantless searches. Part II analyzes state efforts
to monitor prescription drugs. Part III analyzes federal powers and
limitations in monitoring prescription drug distribution. Part IV
presents several arguments that recommend balancing between opioid
monitoring and maintaining Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Part
V concludes that the Fourth Amendment requires the courts to protect
the privacy of prescription records. In the alternative, Part VI suggests
that state legislatures should require all interested parties to obtain
warrants to access prescription records in non-exigent circumstances.
Under all circumstances, sensitive information contained within
prescription records should be redacted to protect the substantive
privacy interests of patients.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution grants
individuals the right to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."23 Thus, the
opioidlindex.html [https://perma.cc/CLZ4-Y5LZ] ("President Donald Trump seemed to advocate
the death penalty for drug dealers . . . during brief comments at an opioid summit at the White
House."); White House Convenes Summit on Opioids, supra note 6 ("[W]e need to move away from
knee-jerk responses that focus just on law enforcement or criminal justice or one particular
program . . . .").
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 880; Sarpatwari et al., supra note 19, at 473-74.
21. See, e.g., Dan Merica, Opioid Treatment Advocates Get a Funding Boost, But Worry It
Isn't Enough, CNN (Feb. 9, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/09/politics/opioid-
treatment-funding/index.htm1 [https://perma.cc/
D5W5-NRRQ] (describing President Trump's approach to the opioid crises as "punitive," rather
than treatment-based); Thursday, March 1st, 2018, NPR: UP FIRST (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/player/embed/589807377/589809176 [https://perma.cc/EM4S-U8KA]; infra
Part I.
22. See infra Section II.A.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
2018] 281
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Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from invading the
privacy of individuals-particularly when searches are warrantless and
lack probable cause.24 In other words, the Constitution guarantees
individual protections against government overreach.25
Notwithstanding its concise nature, Supreme Court jurisprudence
surrounding the Fourth Amendment has led to a number of
interpretations, tests, and exceptions.26
A. The Reasonableness Clause
All searches must be reasonable.27 The reasonableness of a
search is determined by balancing compelling government interests
against an individual's legitimate xpectation of privacy.28 That is, the
Fourth Amendment should be construed to preserve public interests as
well as the rights and expectations of individual citizens.29 As such,
when the government faces "special law enforcement needs, diminished
expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like," the Court
deems warrantless searches to be reasonable.30
1. Reasonable Privacy Expectations
Despite the brevity of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
clause,31 the Supreme Court has long grappled with the Fourth
Amendment's implicit notion of "reasonable privacy expectations."32
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States introduced the
notion of a "reasonable expectation of privacy," understanding the test
as having a dual requirement: first, that an individual must exhibit "an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" and, second, that "the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'3 3
24. See id.
25. Julia L. Ernst, The Constitution in Times of National Crisis: Contextualizing Post-
September 11 Constitutional Ramifications, 88 N.D. L. REV. 51, 57 (2012).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (affirming the third-party
doctrine, which concerns the reasonableness clause); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316
(1972) (affirming the "pervasively regulated industry" exception, which concerns the warrant
clause).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013).
29. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
30. King, 569 U.S. at 447 (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2209-10 (2018); King, 569 U.S.
at 447; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
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Over a decade after deciding Katz, the Court adopted Justice
Harlan's two-prong test in Smith v. Maryland.34 At the same time,
Smith also minimized the subjective component of Justice Harlan's
test,35 stating that:
[I]f the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all
homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter
might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes,
papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of
this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously
monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy
regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances,
where an individual's subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences
alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations
obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection was.
36
In other words, the Smith Court perceived the subjective
component of Justice Harlan's test as "inadequate" in situations where
external factors conflicting with the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
influence an individual's subjective expectations.37
The Court's conception of society's expectations of privacy has
been cursory at best.38 As stated by Judge Posner, the Court's attitude
concerning Fourth Amendment privacy and modern recordkeeping
programs is "difficult to understand."39 In an attempt to empirically
investigate society's expectations of privacy, one study recruited over
two hundred participants to complete an intrusiveness rating scale.
40
The scale listed fifty scenarios, asking participants to rank the
scenarios based on their perceived levels of intrusiveness.4 1 The overall
34. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735, 740. '
35. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE
INVESTIGATION: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS 198 (5th ed. 2012).
36. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5; SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 198.
37. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5.
38. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("The Katz test ... has often been
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.").
39. Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
SUP. CT. REV. 173, 212 (1979) ("What makes the Court's attitude [concerning modern
recordkeeping programs] difficult to understand is that its members . . . believe the Fourth
Amendment protects privacy in the sense of secrecy as well as in the sense of seclusion (e.g., Katz),
and also that the Constitution creates a general right of privacy uncabined by any specific language
in the Constitution (e.g., Griswold). The former belief implies that Miller should have had standing
to object to the subpoena directed at the bank's copies of his financial records. The latter implies
that analysis is not at an end even if the Fourth Amendment does not entitle a person to prevent
the search of a bank's records of his financial transactions, since the constitutional right of privacy
extends beyond the specific guarantees of the Fourth Amendment."); see also infra Section I.A.2.
40. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 728, 737 (1993).
41. See id. at 737-39.
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rankings for a number of the scenarios broadly conformed with prior
holdings of the Court.4 2 However, contrary to the Court's reasoning in
United States v. Miller,43 participants maintained a strong expectation
of privacy in personal records-ranking "[p]erusing bank records" as
one of the more intrusive scenarios.4 4
2. The Third-Party Doctrine Exception
In addition to adopting Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation
of privacy requirement,4 5 the Smith Court also affirmed the third-party
doctrine seen in Miller.4 6 Miller is the seminal third-party doctrine
case, holding that a person has a reduced expectation of privacy in
information "voluntarily conveyed" to third parties.4 7 The idea behind
this doctrine is that individuals assume the risk that their information
will be shared with the government when they reveal their affairs to
third parties.4 8  The Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit third parties from obtaining information
and conveying it to the government.4 9  This holds true even when
individuals believe that third parties will confidentially use their
information for limited purposes.5 0 In Miller, the Court held that the
government's warrantless search of the respondent's bank records did
not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.5 1 The Court reasoned that
the respondent reduced his expectation of privacy when he voluntarily
opened accounts with the third-party bank.52  Therefore, the
government did not need a warrant to obtain the records from the bank.
Similarly, the Smith Court held that a warrantless installment
of a telephone pen register3 did not violate the petitioner's Fourth
42. See id. at 739.
43. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); infra Section I.A.2.
44. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 40, at 738-39 (ranking thirty-eighth out of fifty
scenarios, with one being the least intrusive scenario and fifty being the most intrusive scenario).
45. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
46. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744-45; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
47. See Smith, 442 U.S at 743-44 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-44; Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality
opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
450 (1963)) ("This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."); Kelsey L. Zottnick, Note,
Secondary Data: A Primary Concern, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 193, 205 (2015).
48. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
49. See id.; sources cited supra note 47.
50. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
51. See id. at 437.
52. See id. at 442-43.
53. A telephone pen register is an electronic device that only records dialed telephone
numbers. The device does not record the content of communications. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
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Amendment rights.54 As such, the Court applied Katz's "reasonable
expectation of privacy" analysis. In doing so, it reasoned that even if
the petitioner subjectively expected that the numbers he dialed would
remain private, society would not recognize his expectation as
reasonable since telephone users "typically know they must convey
numerical information to the phone company."55
The Court, however, recently took a different approach to the
third-party doctrine in a decision involving a third-party wireless
carrier and an individual's digital data.56 In Carpenter v. United States,
the Court held that the government violated the petitioner's Fourth
Amendment rights when it seized cell-site data57 containing an
"exhaustive chronicle of [the petitioner's] location information casually
collected by wireless carriers" without a warrant supported by probable
cause.58 The government contended that the third-party doctrine from
Miller and Smith governed because the cell-site records were business
records.59 However, the Court rejected this argument and declined to
extend Miller and Smith to cover cell-site records.60 Accordingly, it
reasoned that there is a "world of difference" between the limited
information in Miller and Smith and the vast amount of detailed
location information in the instant case.61 Furthermore, the Court
explained that the digital data at issue in this case provides an
"intimate window" into a person's life, exposing movements and deeply
personal associations.62 Moreover, it asserted that the "unique nature"
of cell-site records overcomes the fact that the information is held by a
third party.6 3 Nevertheless, the case was decided on narrow grounds-
thus leaving the application of Miller and Smith undisturbed.64 Even
so, Carpenter may continue the recent trend of liberal and conservative
justices banding together to ensure that the "progress of science" does
not undermine Fourth Amendment protections in the digital age.65
54. See id. at 745-46.
55. See id. at 743-44.
56. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214-15 (2018).
57. See id. at 2217. Cell phones create "cell-site data" by continuously connecting to
networks of radio antennas known as "cell sites." By connecting to cell sites, cell phones generate
time-stamped records that contain location information. Id. at 2212-13.
58. Id. at 2219.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 2217, 2220.
61. See id. at 2219.
62. See id. at 2217.
63. Id. at 2220.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 2223; Jeffrey Rosen, A Liberal-Conservative Alliance on the Supreme Court
Against Digital Surveillance, ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2017),
2018] 285
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3. The Third-Party Doctrine, Medicine, and Technology
One can assume that society has a strong expectation of privacy
in prescription records-perhaps even more so than bank records, and
much like digital location data.66 Prescription records often contain
secrets about human conditions concerning mental and physical
health-some of which remain highly stigmatized in society.67
Moreover, records can include sensitive information like credit card
numbers, Social Security numbers, and financial account numbers.68
However, one need not assume such a disposition since federal
legislation has already recognized pharmaceutical record privacy
expectations.*69
Namely, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) requires health care services to execute
"procedures to assure that such information is provided and utilized in
a manner that appropriately protects the confidentiality of the
information and privacy of individuals receiving health care services
and items."70 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has likened individual health
information privacy to other matters the Supreme Court has recognized
the Constitution protects-such as marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, childrearing, and education.71
Thus, certain government attempts to obtain prescription records
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/1 lbipartisanship-supreme-court/547124/
[https://perma.cc/LU5F-K73J].
66. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; supra Sections I.A.1, I.A.2; sources cited infra note 93.
67. See Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1017 (Cal. 2017) (citing Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 n.14 (2001); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977)); Kathleen A.
Ward, A Dose of Reality: The Prescription for a Limited Constitutional Right to Privacy in
Pharmaceutical Records Is Examined in Douglas v. Dobbs, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 73, 111
(2008).
68. See Teresa Carr, Your Prescriptions Are Not a Secret, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 18, 2016),
https://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/prescriptions-not-secret/ [https://perma.cc9K98-8C7T].
69. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 221,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
70. 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7c(a)(3)(B)(ii). The Controlled Substance Monitoring Program, a
federal program that funds state-controlled PDMPs, includes a HIPAA mandate, stating that
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to supersede any Federal privacy or confidentiality
requirement, including the regulations promulgated under section 264(c) of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-191; 110 Stat. 2033) and section 543 of
the Public Health Service Act." See Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682
(1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-3(j)(4) (2012) (citations omitted)).
71. See Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1101-03 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Herring v.
Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000)) ("The scope of personal matters protected by a right
to privacy has never been fully defined. Supreme Court decisions 'make it clear that the right has
some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education.' Because privacy regarding matters ofhealth is closely intertwined
with the activities afforded protection by the Supreme Court, we have held that 'there is a
constitutional right to privacy that protects an individual from the disclosure of information
concerning a person's health."') (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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should be met with considerable scrutiny under the reasonableness
clause of the Fourth Amendment.72
The third-party doctrine extends the government's reach in
ways that present serious threats to privacy, especially in the digital
age.7 3 However, the Court has previously constrained the third-party
doctrine in the medical context-in part because of privacy concerns.74
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, a public hospital-with the help of
state law enforcement and prosecutors-implemented a policy that
authorized hospital staff to conduct drug tests via urine samples on
pregnant patients suspected of substance abuse.75 Unbeknownst to the
patients, the hospital turned the drug test results over to law
enforcement agents.76 Law enforcement then initiated prosecution
against patients who tested positive for drug use while pregnant.77 The
Court held that this conduct violated the Fourth Amendment since the
hospital and law enforcement used the policy, without consent or valid
warrants, primarily to generate evidence for prosecution.78
Although the Court mainly analyzed this case under the "special
needs" doctrine,79 the Court's decision suggests an implicit concern with
applying the third-party doctrine to instances involving substantial
intrusions on privacy.80 Under the third-party doctrine, an individual
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily conveyed to a third party.81 In Ferguson, the hospital is a
third party.8 2 Assuming the patients consented to taking the urine test
72. See Brett Max Kaufman, A Federal Court Says Your Prescription Records Aren't Really
Private. The Supreme Court Might Have Something to Say About That., ACLU (Aug. 4, 2017, 5:00
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/federal-court-says-your-
prescription-records-arent-really [https://perma.cc/G8VE-KDSN]. See generally Brief for
Petitioner, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402), 2017 WL 3575179.
73. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) ("[I]t may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to their parties in the course of carrying
mundane tasks.") (citations omitted)); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 72, at *44-46; Daniel J.
Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for Judicial
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005).
74. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-79 (2001); SLOBOGIN, supra note
35, at 344-45.
75. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69-72.
76. Id. at 77.
77. Id. at 70-71.
78. See id. at 82-83.
79. See id. at 86-87; SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 321 (describing "special needs," an
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements that balances the
intrusion on an individual's privacy interest against the need to support a government program).
80. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
81. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); supra Sections I.A.1, I.A.2.
82. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
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(not to be confused with the uses of the test), the patients voluntarily
conveyed their information to the hospital.83 Accordingly, under Miller,
the patients assumed the risk that their lab results could be shared with
other parties, like the government.84 However, the Court determined
that the government and law enforcement were not privy to such
substantial intrusions on privacy without a warrant.85
The third-party doctrine, however, is not as neatly applicable to
situations involving prescription records. Miller and Smith suggest
that the third-party doctrine only applies when individuals voluntarily
convey their information to third parties.86  In a case involving
prescription records, the process of information conveyance is
attenuated. Presumably, neither physicians nor patients voluntarily
convey information to third-party prescription drug monitoring
programs87 ; rather, it is required by state law.88 Smith could apply to
physicians, since they know or should know that their prescription
practices will be stored within prescription drug monitoring programs.8 9
The applicability of Smith to patients, however, is less clear. Although
patients are normally fully informed that their treatment is "contingent
upon their disclosure of medications and checks of the [prescription
drug monitoring program] data," it is unclear whether patients know or
should know that some state laws require physicians to report patient
information to the third parties that manage prescription drug
monitoring programs, and that those third parties may convey
information to other parties.90 Thus, the applicability of Smith depends
on whether the assumption of risk doctrine contemplates a two-step
process by which individual information gets to the government: first
from the physician to the drug monitoring program, and then from the
drug monitoring program to the government.91
83. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-71; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
84. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-71; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
85. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86.
86. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
87. See Christine Vestal, States Require Doctors to Use Prescription Drug Monitoring
Systems for Patients, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/states-require-doctors-to-use-
prescription-drug-monitoring-systems-for-patients/2018/01/12/c76807b8-f009- 1 1e7-97bf-
bba379b8O9ab story.html?utmterm=.e49a76629389 [https://perma.cclQP7N-C733]. For a
detailed overview of prescription drug monitoring programs, see infra Part II.
88. See Vestal, supra note 87. In such a situation, individuals would presumably assume
less risk of having their information shared with other parties since "[iimplicit in the concept of
assumption of risk is some notion of choice." See Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44; Vestal, supra note 87; infra Sections I.A.2, IIA, II.B.
90. See PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM, CTR. OF EXCELLENCE AT BRANDEIS
U., USE OF PDMP DATA BY OpioID ADDICTION TREATMENT PROGRAMS 5 (2015); infra Sections IIA,
II.B.
91. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
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With regard to the recent Carpenter uling, the sensitive nature
of cell-site data is analogous to that of prescription records.92 Much like
cell-site data, prescription records also provide an "intimate window"
into a person's life-exposing deeply personal mental and physical
health details.93 Although prescription records do not necessarily
reveal location information in the same manner that cell-site data do,
there is "a world of difference" between the bank records seen in Miller
and the phone records seen in Smith on one hand, and prescription
records on the other.94 Namely, the records in Miller and Smith are
business records, while Congress has declared prescription records
confidential and private-thus warranting special protections.95 As
such, courts should similarly decline to extend Miller and Smith to
prescription records if presented with the opportunity.
Unlike telephone companies and financial institutions9 6-where
the means to achieve the ends of those services are varied and do not
require third-party involvement-services provided through hospitals
and pharmacies are necessary for patients that desire legitimate
medical care and prescriptions.97 As such, it is critical to both create
legislation that allows for pharmaceutical regulation, and not deter
individuals from receiving medical treatment out of fear of
automatically waiving their rights to privacy and procedural justice.98
92. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
93. See id.; Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1017 (Cal. 2017) (citing Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 n.14 (2001); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977)) ("[A]n
individual's prescription records contain intimate details about his or her medical conditions, the
government's ability to access these records may cause patients to hesitate to seek appropriate
medical treatment."); Ward, supra note 67, at 111.
94. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
95. See id. at 2216; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2012).
96. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484
(2014)) ("[C]ell phones and the services they provide are 'such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life' that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society."); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
97. See Why Do I Need Prior Authorization for a Prescription Drug?, BLUE CROSS BLUE
SHIELD MICH., https://www.bcbsm.com/index/health-insurance-help/faqs/plan-types/pharmacy/
why-do-i-need-prior-authorization-for-prescription-drug.html [https://perma.cc/AVS9-2XDU] (last
visited Sept. 21, 2018) (requiring review of prescriptions before applying plan coverage to
determine if medication is "necessary and appropriate"); sources cited supra note 93.
98. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 n.14 (2001) ("[A]n intrusion on ...
[privacy] expectation[s] may have adverse consequences because it may deter patients from
receiving needed medical care."); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977) ("Unquestionably, some
individuals' concern for their own privacy may lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical
attention.").
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B. The Warrant Clause
In addition to the reasonableness provision, the Fourth
Amendment requires government officials to obtain search warrants
from independent magistrates before conducting searches.99  The
official must demonstrate that probable cause exists to search the
particular person or object involving criminal suspicion.100 Like the
reasonableness clause, the Supreme Court has also recognized a few
exceptions to the warrant clause.10 1 Namely, this Section addresses the
administrative search exception.
1. The Administrative Search Exception
The Court has construed administrative searches as one of many
warrant exceptions.102 The primary goals of administrative searches
are facilitative and regulatory in nature.103 Moreover, administrative
searches, or "inspections," are often conducted by nonpolice officials.10 4
Unlike ordinary crime control, incriminating evidence found during
inspections normally results in fines or civil sanctions.105 Accordingly,
administrative inspections tend to be less hostile than police intrusions
because the industries that undergo these searches are routinely
inspected; pervasively regulated; minimally intruded upon; normally
subjected to mandated inspections for public safety, which is
traditionally accepted by the public; and not inclined to have the same
expectations of privacy as private citizens.06
This Section analyzes opioid crisis under two administrative
search exceptions: the Biswell-Dewey doctrine and the Camara-See
doctrine.107 Under the Biswell-Dewey warrant exception, as long as a
search is not for the purpose of ordinary crime control, no warrants are
required for pervasively regulated industries because of the supposed
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
100. See id.





106. See id. at 317-2 1.
107. See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967). The opioid crisis can also be analyzed under the special needs search exception. See
SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 317. See generally generally New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985).
290 [Vol. 21:1:277
2018] DRUG RECORD PRIVACY 291
lesser expectation of privacy in such industries.108 Under the Camara-
See warrant exception, agencies can conduct warrantless searches if
there is no other way to protect health and safety.109 These searches
cannot be for ordinary crime control purposes.110 Moreover, the
inspecting agency must give notice of the impending inspection in
writing or in person, seek consent, and-if consent is not forthcoming-
seek a warrant.'
With regard to the opioid crisis, it is unclear whether federal
agents or state officials are regulating pharmacy prescriptions records
for reasons other than ordinary crime control.112 However, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) is undeniably a crime-control
agency, as its mission is to "enforce the controlled substances laws and
regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil
justice system of the United States . .. those organizations . .. involved
in the. . . distribution of controlled substances."13 As such, DEA agents
and state law enforcement officials-similar to those in Ferguson-with
like missions should not have warrantless access to prescription records
under the Biswell-Dewey warrant exception.114
The Camara-See warrant exception's applicability to accessing
prescription records is more complicated because of the broad nature of
both the doctrine and the Controlled Substances Act.115 Due to the
108. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 320-21 ("[T]he [Dewey] Court explained that [the
Biswell] exception applied only when the legislature 'has reasonably determined that warrantless
searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the . . . regulatory presence is
sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be
aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.'
More specifically, the Court concluded, the exception applies when three conditions are met: (1)
the government has a 'substantial interest' in the activity being regulated; (2) warrantless
searches are necessary for effective enforcement, as in Biswell; and (3) the inspection program
provides 'a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant' by identifying and limiting the
purpose and scope of the inspection.").
109. See id. at 320.
110. See id. at 317, 319.
111. Id. at 319.
112. Depending on the state, prescription records can be accessed by a variety of groups
ranging from prescribers, anesthetists, health care practitioners, medical examiners, state and
federal law enforcement officers, regulatory boards, and drug court judges. See NAT'L ALL. FOR
MODEL STATE DRUG LAws, PRESCRIPTION MONITORING PROGRAM STATE PROFrLES-WESTVIRGINIA
22 (2014), http://www.namsdl.org/library/2FE6DO3C-9AE2-7444-D36EF1CDECEEOE8F/
[https://perma.cc/GD49-C7AN]; Frequently Asked Questions, TENN. DEP'T HEALTH (June 20, 2017),
https://www.tn.gov/health/health-program-areas/health-professional-boards/csmd-board/csmd-
board/faq.html [https://perma.cc/86LU-9FW8]. For a more detailed discussion on prescription
record regulation, see infra Parts II, Ill.
113. Mission, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/about/mission.shtml
[https://perma.cc/AY6F-8N4K] (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).
114. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69-70 (2001); SLOBOGIN, supra note
35, at 320; Mission, supra note 113.
115. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 317-20; infra Section III.A.
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extreme condition of the opioid crisis, an agency can easily advocate for
warrantless searches by contending that this type of access to
prescription records is the last available option for protecting the health
and safety of opioid users.116 Even so, the Camara-See xception still
requires that the inspecting agency give notice, seek consent, and
finally seek a warrant if consent is not forthcoming.117 Although these
procedures seem inconsequential when compared to the overwhelming
force of the opioid crisis, the legal system cannot-and simply does not
need to-gamble the predictability of procedural rights to regulate
opioid prescription and misuse.*118
II. STATE REGULATION
Prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) are state-level
electronic databases that record controlled substance prescriptions.1 19
PDMPs have a number of functions that are generally comprised of two
components: (1) collecting prescription information from physicians and
pharmacists and (2) storing prescription information.120  State
legislatures establish the regulations that govern the level of access
certain groups have to PDMP information.121 Since pharmacy
employees input patient data into PDMPs when they disperse
prescriptions to patients, PDMPs can familiarize health care providers
with patient prescription histories. In turn, these prescription histories
can inform health care providers' prescribing decisions.122 As such,
PDMPs are only useful if health care providers analyze patient
prescription histories stored on the system before prescribing
treatment.123
116. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 319-20.
117. See id.
118. See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2013)
("Blind balancing also leads to government interests trumping individual rights in most criminal
procedure cases. It can also lead to an overestimation of risk in the criminal context .... The risks
to safety can often be exaggerated where the government relies on hypothetical threats or common
sense rather than threats grounded in evidence.").
119. See What States Need to Know About PDMPs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdmp/states.html
[https://perma.cc/98C9-MWDN].
120. See Prescription Drug Monitoring Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), PRESCRIPTION
DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CTR.,
http://www.pdmpassist.org/content/prescription-drug-monitoring-frequently-asked-questions-faq
[https://perma.cc/7J33-AS9S] (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).
121. See id.




Most states independently fund their respective PDMPs.124 The
major sources for most PDMPs are state general funds and licensing
fees.125 As of August 2017, the federal government constituted the
primary source of funding for only eight PDMPs.126 As stated by the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, PDMPs "continue to be
among the most promising state-level interventions to improve opioid
prescribing."1 2 7 However, other sources suggest that PDMPs are not so
beneficial.128 A twelve-year study revealed that PDMPs were not
effective in reducing opioid overdose mortality rates.129 Moreover,
many PDMP laws have led to heightened litigation concerning
constitutional privacy rights.130 While some state legislation requires
officials to obtain valid warrants to access PDMPs,131 others take a more
expansive approach-allowing federal agents warrantless access to
state PDMPs.132
A. Warrant-Based Access to Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
Some state legislatures have narrowed the scope of PDMP access
to certain actors.133 Namely, states have regulated access to PDMPs by
requiring law enforcement agents to obtain valid warrantS134 or valid
court orders based on probable cause.135 For example, the Rhode Island
Uniformed Controlled Substance Act maintains that information
124. See PDMPs Major Source of Funding, PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM





127. See What States Need to Know About PDMPs, supra note 119.
128. See, e.g., Young Hee Nam et al., State Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and
Fatal Drug Overdoses, 23 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 297, 297-98 (2017); Devon T. Unger, Note,
Minding Your Meds: Balancing the Needs for Patient Privacy and Law Enforcement in Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 345, 352 (2014).
129. See Nam et al., supra note 128, at 297-98.
130. See, e.g., Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf't Admin., 860
F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2017); U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611-
DN-DBP, 2017 WL 3189868, at *1-2 (D. Utah July 27, 2017); Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d
1011, 1014 (Cal. 2017); Lambert v. Larizza, No. 13-31402-CICI, 2015 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 65961, at
*11-12 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 6, 2015); Unger, supra note 128, at 352.
131. See, e.g., 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a)(4) (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37f-
301(2)(m) (West 2018).
132. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 53-10-306(a) (West 2016); Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 112 ("[State] law allows a number of other state and federal officials to register with
the database including, certain law enforcement officers, medical examiners, drug court judges,
and others.").
133. See, e.g., 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37f-301(2).
134. See, e.g., 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a)(4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37f-301(2).
135. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 431A.865(2)(a)(G) (2017).
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contained in PDMPs shall be disclosed only "[p]ursuant to a valid
search warrant based on probable cause to believe a violation of federal
or state criminal law has occurred and that specified information
contained in the database would assist in the investigation of the
crime."136
In Oregon, the state's Health Authority can disclose PDMP
information that implicates a law or regulation "[p]ursuant o a valid
court order based on probable cause and issued at the request of a
federal, state or local law enforcement agency engaged in an authorized
drug-related investigation involving a person to whom the requested
information pertains."137 As such, legislation that calls for warrants, or
showings of probable cause at least, can balance the proper regulation
of government interests with the constitutional protections of patient
privacy.138 However, a recent federal district court decision has proven
that some courts view government interests and privacy as being
mutually exclusive.139
United States Dep't of Justice v. Utah Dep't of Commerce involves
the Utah Controlled Substances Database (UCSD), an electronic
database that stores "every prescription for a controlled substance
dispensed in the state."140  Prior to the 2015 UCSD statutory
amendment, Utah permitted any law enforcement agent to access the
UCSD without a warrant or other process, so long as the officer affirmed
that the access was being made in furtherance of a criminal
investigation. 141 Nevertheless, in 2015, the Utah legislature amended
this statute by requiring federal, state, and local officials to obtain a
valid search warrant in order to access information on the database.142
The DEA petitioned the court to enforce an administrative
subpoena against the Utah Department of Commerce and the Utah
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("State").143 The
subpoena sought to obtain all UCSD records involving controlled
prescriptions issued over several months by a medical professional
suspected of prescribing controlled substances in violation of the
136. See 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a)(4).
137. See OR. REV. STAT. § 431A.865(2)(a)(G).
138. See Unger, supra note 128, at 383.
139. See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *1-2.
140. See Order Granting Motion to Intervene at 2, U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Utah Dep't of
Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611-DN (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2017).
141. See id. For a review of law enforcement uses of the UCSD, see OFF. OF THE LEGIS.
AUDITOR GEN., STATE OF UTAH, A REVIEW OF THE USE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE DATABASE
BY LAW ENFORCEMENT, REP. No. ILR 2015-E 1, 4 (2015).
142. See Order Granting Motion to Intervene, supra note 140, at 2.
143. See id. at 4.
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Controlled Substances Act.1 4 4  Citing the warrant provision in the
UCSD statute, the State refused to provide the DEA with the requested
UCSD records.14 5  The DEA argued that a subpoena was sufficient
under the Controlled Substances Act, which provides that "the Attorney
General may subp[o]ena witnesses, compel the attendance and
testimony of witnesses, and require the production of any records
(including books, papers, documents, and other tangible things which
constitute or contain evidence) which the Attorney General finds
relevant or material to the investigation."146  The court ignored the
State,14 7 reasoning that the supremacy clause preempted state law and
that pharmacy patients do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in UCSD records since "[tihe prescription drug industry is highly
regulated."14 8 As such, the court ordered the State to comply with the
subpoena within twenty-one days.149
B. Warrantless Access to Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
A number of state laws grant federal agents and other officials
significant access to PDMPs.15 0 Among these states are some of those
hit hardest by the opioid crisis: Tennessee and West Virginia. 15 1
Tennessee state law allows prescribers, certified registered nurse
anesthetists, health care practitioners, and "a number of other state
and federal officials"-including "certain law enforcement officers,
medical examiners, drug court judges, and others"-to register for
access to its PDMPs.15 2  Meanwhile, West Virginia's PDMP law
authorizes prescribers, dispensers, licensing and regulatory boards,
authorized agents of the Bureau for Medical Services law enforcement,
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner-as well as law enforcement,
judicial, and prosecutorial officials-to receive PDMP information.153
144. See id.; U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2017 WL 3189868, at *1-2 ("The subpoena served
November 12, 2015, seeks 'all controlled substance prescriptions issued by the [prescriber] subject
of the investigation ... for the period January 8, 2015 to the present."').
145. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2017 WL 3189868, at *2.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at *6-7.
149. Id. at *1.
150. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 112; Harrison Jacobs, The State Hardest
Hit by the Opioid Crisis Thinks It Has a Solution, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2016, 5:17 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/west-virginias-solution-to-the-opioid-crisis-2016-4
[https://perma.cc/CL92-JMZX].
151. See Drug Overdose Death Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 19,
2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/datalstatedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/Z4JT-4CCU]
(illustrating the number of drug overdose deaths by state); Jacobs, supra note 150.
152. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 112 (emphasis added).
153. See NAT'L ALL. FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS, supra note 112, at 2.
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Despite its relatively low rate of overdose deaths,154 California
also has fairly unrestricted PDMP laws.155 California's PDMP is known
as the Controlled Substance Utilization Review Evaluation System
(CURES). 156  Pursuant to the California Health and Safety Code,
CURES exists to assist "law enforcement and regulatory agencies in
their efforts to control the diversion and resultant abuse of Schedule II,
Schedule III, and Schedule IV controlled substances."15 7 In addition,
the information stored in CURES is available to the "appropriate state,
local, and federal public agencies for disciplinary, civil, or criminal
purposes and to other agencies or entities."15 8 More importantly, the
current legislation does not mention any warrant or court order
requirements.159
In Lewis v. Superior Court, a physician claimed that the Medical
Board of California ("Board") violated his patients' privacy rights under
the California Constitution.16 0 The Board, whose inspectors are police
officers, investigated physicians based on patient complaints and
independent initiatives.161 Here, the Board initiated an investigation
of the physician after a patient unrelated to the case alleged that the
physician recommended an extreme weight-loss regimen.162 After
reviewing over two hundred pages of information from CURES, which
contained the prescription records of hundreds of patients who did not
give authorization, the Board requested that five of the physician's
patients release their full medical records.163 Three of the patients
consented, while the other two patients' records were obtained through
administrative subpoenas, which ultimately led to several charges
against the physician-including excessive prescribing.164
154. See Drug Overdose Death Data, supra note 151.
155. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11165(c)(2)(A) (Deering 2017), with 21 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a)(1)-(10) (2014), and OR. REV. STAT. § 431A.865(2)(a)(A)I) (2017), and
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37f-301(2)(m) (West 2018). At the time of writing, California's PDMP law
contains no warrant requirement. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11165. However, the statute asit stands
is effective until January 1, 2019. See id. Future effective updates specifically address warrants-
stating that "regulations, at a minimum, address ... [t]he conditions under which a warrant,
subpoena, or court order is required for a law enforcement agency to obtain information from [the
PDMP] as a part of a criminal investigation." See Assemb. B. 1753, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2018).
156. See Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Cal. 2017).
157. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11165(a) (Deering 2017).
158. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11165(c)(2)(A).
159. See id. For more information on future effective updates to this legislation, see sources
cited and accompanying text supra note 155.
160. Lewis, 397 P.3d at 1016.






With regard to his patients' prescription records, the physician
argued that the Board did not meet the "good cause requirement" used
in cases involving medical records.165  Under the good cause
requirement, a party seeking access to a nonconsenting patient's
records must have a 'written showing' of the equivalent of probable or
good cause made to the superior court judge."16 6 Ultimately, the court
decided that the good cause requirement was not applicable to
pharmaceutical records since pharmaceutical records involve less
sensitive information than medical records.167 Accordingly, it reasoned
that the Board's actions did not violate the patients' right to privacy
under the California Constitution since the Board's invasion was
minimal and justified by a compelling state interest.168
III. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Beyond state efforts to combat the opioid epidemic, the federal
government has adopted its own initiative against the crisis.169
Pledging to "spend a lot of time, a lot of effort and a lot of money,"
President Donald Trump stated on August 10, 2017, that the opioid
crisis was a "national emergency."170 However, two months after this
statement, President Trump instead directed a "public health
emergency" through the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). 171 Although
national emergencies and public health emergencies are both forms of
national emergency declarations, the scope and funding options
distinguish the declarations.1 72  This Part analyzes the federal
165. Id. at 1016, 1020.
166. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
(quoting CAL. GOVT CODE § 7476(b)(1) (Deering 2017)).
167. See Lewis, 397 P.3d at 1020-21 (contending that medical records are more sensitive
than pharmaceutical records because "[a] patient's complete medical file may include descriptions
of symptoms, family history, diagnoses, test results, and other intimate details concerning
treatment").
168. See id. at 1019-21.
169. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis a 'Health Emergency' but
Requests No Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/politics/trump-opioid-crisis.html [https://perma.ce/4LUY-
SNVC?type=image].
170. Joel Achenbach et al., Trump Says Opioid Crisis Is a National Emergency, Pledges




171. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (2012); Hirschfeld Davis, supra
note 169; Dan Merica, What Trump's Opioid Announcement Means-and Doesn't Mean, CNN (Oct.
27, 2017, 9:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/national-health-emergency-national-
disaster/index.html [https://perma.cc/WF45-7687].
172. See Merica, supra note 171.
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government's ability to regulate the opioid crisis through the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), the PHSA, and other Department of Justice
(DOJ) actions.
A. The Controlled Substances Act
The CSA identifies drugs and other substances based on five
classifications or "schedules."173  When determining controlled
substance schedules, the US attorney general considers several
factors-including potential for abuse, scope of abuse, history of abuse,
and scientific evidence of effects.174 All opioids or opioid derivatives are
classified as either Schedule I or II drugs, depending on their safety and
status as accepted medical treatments.175 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 880,
administrative inspections do not require warrants in situations
involving an "imminent danger to health or safety" or "other exceptional
or emergency circumstance[s] where time or opportunity to apply for a
warrant is lacking."176
1. Imminent Danger to Health or Safety
Temporarily disregarding any potential implications caused by
the public health emergency declaration,177 this section of the CSA
should not be interpreted as a free pass for the federal government to
access PDMPs without warrants.178 To properly assess how the CSA
squares with the Camara-See warrant exception, one must (1) analyze
the extent of the imminence of accessing PDMP records during the
current situation and (2) analyze whether the circumstances
surrounding PDMP inspections require expeditious access to records
that preclude obtaining a warrant.179
In order to analyze whether PDMP records are connected to
imminent dangers, the relevant term must be defined. "Imminent
danger" is not a term of art under the definitions section of the CSA.180
However, a later section that grants the US attorney general authority
to deny, revoke, or suspend18 1 noncompliant registrants of controlled
173. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 811 (2012).
174. § 811(a), (c).
175. § 812.
176. § 880(c)(2), (4).
177. See infra Section III.B.
178. See discussion and sources cited supra Section I.B.1.
179. See § 880(c)(2), (4); discussion and sources cited supra Section I.B.1.
180. See § 802.
181. See § 824.
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substanceS182 defines "imminent danger to the public health or safety"
as a "substantial ikelihood of an immediate threat that death, serious
bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance will occur in the absence
of an immediate suspension of the registration."183 Under a "whole act"
rule of interpretation, this term should be presumed to have a
consistent meaning throughout the CSA.18 4  Accordingly,
administrative inspections do not require warrants if a death, serious
bodily harm, or abuse of controlled substance will occur immediately.'*5
In most cases, this will be an exceedingly high bar to meet186-especially
when considering the following Section.
2. Exigency Preventing Warrant Procurement
Exigent circumstances, or emergencies, may permit law
enforcement officials to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement.'87 The policy rationale behind this exception is that it
would be impractical to require law enforcement agents to deliberate
whether they will be able to obtain a warrant during emergency
situations that may risk "too much" evidence destruction.8 8 However,
in search cases-unlike arrests-exigent circumstances are so
182. See § 823 (identifying registrants of controlled substances as manufacturers,
distributors, practitioners, pharmacies, and researchers).
183. § 824(d)(2) (emphasis added) ("In this subsection, the phrase 'imminent danger to the
public health or safety' means that, due to the failure of the registrant to maintain effective
controls against diversion or otherwise comply with the obligations of a registrant under this title
or title III, there is a substantial ikelihood of an immediate threat that death, serious bodily harm,
or abuse of a controlled substance will occur in the absence of an immediate suspension of the
registration.").
184. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside -
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 930 (2013) (defining "the whole act rule" as a textual canon that presumes that statutory
terms have a consistent meaning throughout a given statute).
185. See § 880(c)(2), (4); Immediate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/immediate [https://perma.cc/8C7F-K8RR] (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).
186. Consider a situation similar to that in Lewis v. Superior Court, where the Board first
received a complaint, opened an investigation against the physician, and reviewed over 200 pages
of PDMP information. See Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1015 (Cal. 2017). Here,
immediacy does not seem to be at issue enough to surpass the warrant requirement, especially
with the advent of telephonic warrants. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013) (quoting
State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 779 (Utah 2007)) (noting that telephonic warrants and other
methods of quickly obtaining warrants undermine the per se exigency approach that "improperly
ignore [s] the current and future technological developments in warrant procedures, and might well
diminish the incentive for jurisdictions 'to pursue progressive approaches to warrant acquisition
that preserve the protections afforded by the warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law
enforcement"').
187. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (holding that warrantless
daytime home entries are impermissible, thus violating the Fourth Amendment, unless exigent
circumstances exist).
188. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 181 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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"sufficiently unusual" that the Court has suggested that the "benefits
of a warrant sufficiently outweigh the burdens imposed."189
Moreover, with the advent of telephonic warrants and evolving
technologies,190 exigent circumstances hould almost never prevent law
enforcement from obtaining valid warrants.191 In McNeely, an officer
stopped the respondent for speeding and repeatedly crossing the road's
centerline.192  The officer noticed signs that the respondent was
intoxicated: bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol.193
The officer administered a field sobriety test, which the respondent
failed.194 After the respondent refused to take a breathalyzer test, the
officer arrested the respondent and drove him to the hospital for
nonconsensual, warrantless blood testing.195
The government argued that the per se exigency rule applied,
with the respondent's natural metabolizing of alcohol providing a
sufficient basis for a warrantless search.196 However, the Court found
in favor of the respondent, holding that the involuntary blood test was
an invalid search that required a warrant.197 Moreover, the Court found
that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement did not apply
since none of the circumstances would have led the officer to believe
that he faced an emergency.198 In its decision, the Court also considered
the fact that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit
magistrate judges to telephonically issue warrants-thus decreasing
the "risk" of evidence destruction.199
The principles applied to the facts in McNeely can be squarely
applied to those facts in United States Dep't of Justice v. Utah Dep't of
Commerce.200 Utah's PDMP statute required federal, state, and local
officials to obtain a valid search warrant to access information on the
database.201 However, the court found for the DOJ under the third-
party doctrine-thus enforcing the subpoena, which sought to obtain all
189. Payton, 445 U.S. at 619 (White, J., dissenting).
190. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a) (allowing magistrate judges to consider information
communicated by telephone or electronic means when issuing warrants).
191. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 155-56.
192. Id. at 145.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 145-46.
196. See id. at 163.
197. See id. at 165.
198. Id. at 141 ("The trial court agreed, concluding that the exigency exception to the
warrant requirement did not apply because, apart from the fact that McNeely's blood alcohol was
dissipating, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency.").
199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154, 181.
200. See supra Section II.A.
201. See Order Granting Motion to Intervene, supra note 140, at 2.
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UCSD records involving controlled prescriptions issued over a several-
month period by a medical professional suspected of prescribing
controlled substances in violation of the CSA. 20 2 If, in the alternative,
the DOJ argued that an agency subpoena allowed the agency to
expeditiously gather evidence under the exigency exception-and that
a warrant issued by an independent magistrate would have risked the
destruction of the prescription records-McNeely addresses this
argument by means of the telephonic warrant.203
After all, warrants are superior to subpoenas since warrants are
not only explicitly mentioned in the text of the Fourth Amendment, but
also because of their purpose: ensuring that a detached magistrate
evaluates whether law enforcement has a sound reason for potentially
infringing on the privacy rights of individuals.204 The Court addressed
this notion in Cooldige v. New Hampshire.205 In Coolidge, the Court
held that the search of the petitioner's automobile violated the Fourth
Amendment since the warrant used by law enforcement was not issued
by a detached magistrate.206 Instead, the warrant was signed and
issued by the state attorney general-who was actively involved in the
investigation and later served as the chief prosecutor at the
respondent's trial.207
If per se exigency of blood alcohol content is not enough to trigger
the exigency requirement in McNeely, per se exigency of the opioid crisis
is also insufficient.208 PDMP records do not implicate imminent
dangers under the CSA's definition of the term, which is a danger that
involves "substantial likelihood of an immediate threat that death,
serious bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance will occur."2 0 9
Although the opioid crisis has a substantial impact on the country,
obtaining pharmacy records without a warrant may not rise to the level
202. See id. at 15-16.
203. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154, 181.
204. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 n.6 (1990);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)) ("[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."').
205. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 446-47.
206. Id. at 446, 449.
207. Id. at 447.
208. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 141.
209. 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added) ("In this subsection, the phrase
'imminent danger to the public health or safety' means that, due to the failure of the registrant to
maintain effective controls against diversion or otherwise comply with the obligations of a
registrant under this title or title III, there is a substantial likelihood of an immediate threat that
death, serious bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance will occur in the absence of an
immediate suspension of the registration.").
2018] 301
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
of exigency required by the exception.210  As such, unless the
circumstances uggest that law enforcement officials face an "imminent
danger to the public health or safety," warrants issued by detached
magistrates-not subpoenas-should be required at all times.211
B. Implications of a Public Health Emergency Declaration
Besides the CSA, the federal government can also combat the
opioid crisis through other acts and administrative departments.212 On
March 1, 2018, the White House convened a summit on opioids.213 At
the summit, several panelists-including US Health and Human
Services Secretary Alex M. Azar II and then-US Attorney General Jeff
Sessions-discussed treatment and prevention responses to the
crisis.2 14  Although the Health and Human Services secretary's
responses to the crisis are statutorily limited,215 the US attorney
general has greater enforcement discretion.216
1. Actions by the Department of Health and Human Services
Pursuant to section 319 of the PHSA, a public health emergency
involves "a disease or disorder [that] presents a public health
emergency" or "significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or
bioterrorist attacks."217 The secretary determines whether public
health emergencies exist and how to respond to such emergencies.218
After the secretary declares a public health emergency, the secretary
can respond to the declaration by (1) making grants, (2) providing
awards for expenses, (3) entering into contracts, or (4) conducting and
supporting investigations into the cause, treatment, or prevention of
210. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 142; discussion and sources cited supra notes 8-12.
211. See 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)(2); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 142.
212. See, e.g., President Donald Trump Speaks at White House Opioid Summit - March 1,
2018 | NBC News, supra note 14, 1:27:46-51.
213. See generally White House Convenes Summit on Opioids, supra note 6.
214. See generally President Donald Trump Speaks at White House Opioid Summit - March
1, 2018 | NBC News, supra note 14. In light of the recent resignation of US Attorney General Jeff
Sessions, the DOJ's prosecutorial approach against the opioid epidemic is uncertain. See Carrie
Johnson, Jeff Sessions Forced Out as Attorney General After Constant Criticism from Trump, NPR
(Nov. 7, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/07/539109386/jeff-sessions-out-as-attorney-
general-after-steady-drumbeat-of-criticism-from-tr [https://perma.cc/MA6N-XJGF].
215. See infra Section III.B.1.
216. See infra Section III.B.2.
217. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2012); Public Health Emergency
Declaration Q&As, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY (June 26, 2018),
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/Pages/phe-qa.aspx [https://perma.ce/N833-WCSS].
218. See § 247d(a).
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the emergency.219 Additionally, the secretary is authorized to access
funds appropriated to the Public Health Emergency Fund.220 This fund
is intended to supplement other sources of funding.221 Lastly, the
secretary has discretion to grant extensions or waive sanctions relating
to Health and Human Services data submissions and reports.222 The
secretary can make such exceptions only after determining that
individuals, public entities, or private entities were unable to comply
with deadlines for submitting such data or reports as a result of the
public health emergency.223
In addition to these actions, the secretary can respond to a public
health emergency by taking a "variety of discretionary actions."224
These actions include modifying, adjusting, and waiving certain
requirements for programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and HIPAA. 2 2 5
However, any such modifications must be pursuant to section 1135 of
the Social Security Act, which does not authorize broad prosecutorial
discretion that could possibly prompt concern about privacy
protections.226
On October 26, 2017, the acting secretary issued a statement
upon declaring the opioid crisis a public health emergency.227 The
statement asserted that the public health emergency "brings a new
level of urgency to the comprehensive [Health and Human Services
Department] strategy," also stating that the department invested
nearly $900 million in opioid-specific funding in 2017.228 In passing the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Congress promised $6 billion to address






224. Public Health Emergency Declaration Q&As, supra note 217.
225. See § 247d(d); Public Health Emergency Declaration Q&As, supra note 217.
226. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Public Health Emergency Declaration Q&As, supra note 217.
227. See OFFICE OF THE SECY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DETERMINATION
THAT A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY EXISTS (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opioid%20PHE%2ODeclaration-no-sig.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2VC-DZH7]; HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency to
Address National Opioid Crisis, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/26/hhs-acting-secretary-declares-public-health-
emergency-address-national-opioid-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/2F82-TQB9].
228. HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency to Address National Opioid
Crisis, supra note 227.
229. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C § 20802); German Lopez, Congress's Budget Deal Doesn't Do Enough to Fight
the Opioid Crisis, VOX (Feb. 9. 2018, 11:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/2/8/16988236/congress-federal-budget-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/JXH4-M4KW].
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Congress has appropriated $8.5 billion in opioid-specific funding.230
Nevertheless, experts suggest that this funding is insufficient.231
2. Actions by the Department of Justice
While the secretary's remarks mainly focused on treatment,
then-US Attorney Jeff Sessions' remarks emphasized the need for
stricter, "resolute" law enforcement.232 As a part of this approach, the
DOJ undertook the largest health care fraud enforcement action in DOJ
history in July 2017.233 The action involved charging 412 individuals-
115 of whom were physicians, nurses, and other medical professionals-
for allegedly participating in "health care fraud schemes" involving
around $1.3 billion. 234 The DOJ also charged some of these physicians
for prescribing and distributing opioids.23 5 According to a press release
issued by the then-US Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
the office executed search warrants for criminal complaint charges
against two physicians.236
Although stricter law enforcement against unlawful medical
practitioners could very well be a necessary part of the equation to
230. See Katie Zezima & Seung Min Kim, Trump Signs Sweeping Opioid Bill. Expect to
Hear About It on the Campaign Trail., WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-signs-sweeping-opioid-bill-expect-to-hear-about-
it-on-the-campaign-trail/2 018/10/24/1328598c-d7a9- 1 le8-aeb7-
ddcad4aOa54e story.htmlutmterm=.5el539f8bd78 [https:/perma.cc/M4P2-ZQY5].
231. See Lopez, supra note 229 ('"Over two years, I think we need at least $12 billion for
opioid addiction treatment'-an estimate [Andrew Kolodny, an opioid policy expert at Brandeis
University] reached by calculating how much it would cost to provide low-threshold, effective
outpatient addiction treatment in every county in the US."); Zezima & Kim. supra note 230.
232. See Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: HHS Chief Pushes Trump Opioid




[https://perma.cc/GH7U-L5NU]; President Donald Trump Speaks at White House Opioid Summit
- March 1, 2018 | NBC News, supra note 14, 1:27:10-18, 1:27:27-45.
233. See National Health Care Fraud Results in Charges Against over 412 Individual
Responsible for $1.3 Billion in Fraud Losses, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (July 13, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/national-health-care-fraud-takedown-results-charges-against-
over-412-individuals-responsible [https://perma.cc/K6Q5-2FZ3]; President Donald Trump Speaks
at White House Opioid Summit - March 1, 2018 | NBC News, supra note 14, 1:27:27-45.
234. See National Health Care Fraud Results in Charges Against over 412 Individual
Responsible for $1.3 Billion in Fraud Losses, supra note 233. The DOJ defined "health care fraud
schemes" as medical practices that "bill[ed] Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE ... for medically
unnecessary prescription drugs and compounded medications that often were never even
purchased and/or distributed to beneficiaries." Id.
235. See id.
236. See Three Doctors, a Chiropractor, Three Therapists and Medical Company Owners





solving the opioid crisis, the Trump Administration's rhetoric raises
concerns about the possibility of circumventing legal process for stricter
law enforcement.237 For example, in a speech given in Ohio, President
Trump stated that opioid regulators "have to get really, really tough-
really mean-with the drug pushers and the drug dealers."2 38 This
could encourage regulators to concentrate on the ends rather than the
means of regulating criminal behavior, thus leading to more Fourth
Amendment violations.239  Instead, the administration should
encourage law enforcement to adopt a model of enforcement that
involves the appropriate use of criminal law as a means to crime-solving
ends.240
IV. SOLUTION
Existing Supreme Court precedent is not compatible with
innovations of the digital age that significantly increase the
government's potential to access intimate information.24 1  Given
modern technology, current law and proposed solutions allow the
government nearly unlimited warrantless access to private
information-a situation that conflicts with the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment and HIPAA. 2 4 2 If a patient receives medical attention from
a physician who prescribes legal opioids to the patient and who also,
unbeknownst to the patient, is suspected to be engaging in illegal
prescribing practices by a zealous government official-that patient's
prescription slip instantly transforms into an invitation for the
government to peruse through any records the patient has stored in a
given PDMP.2 4 3  Under the third-party doctrine, regardless of the
237. See Thursday, March 1st, 2018, supra note 21; Merica, supra note 21.
238. Thursday, March 1st, 2018, supra note 21 (emphasis added).
239. See HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 1 (1990).
240. See id.
241. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 72, at *12.
242. See Ramya Shah, Note, From Beepers to GPS: Can the Fourth Amendment Keep Up
with Electronic Tracking Technology?, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 281, 294 (2009). But cf
Robert Parker Tricarico, Note, A Nation in the Throes ofAddiction: Why a National Prescription
Drug Monitoring Program Is Needed Before It Is Too Late, 37 WHITIER L. REV. 117, 120 (2015)
(arguing that the federal government should create a national PDMP-a proposal that completely
sidesteps the Fourth Amendment). HIPAA protects a variety of health care information, including
(1) information that health care providers chart in patient medical records; (2) physician-patient
conversations; and (3) most other patient health information. See Your Rights Under HIPAA, U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaalfor-individuals/guidance-materials-for-
consumers/index.html [https://perma.cc/CPR7-3MYF] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). However, many
state agencies and most law enforcement agencies are not required to follow HIPAA Privacy and
Security Rules. Id.
243. For the purposes of this Note, the Author assumes that standing is a nonissue since
HIPAA's Privacy Rule gives patients "rights over [their] health information and sets rules and
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official's lack of supporting evidence or otherwise, no independent
magistrate will review the reasons that gave this official cause to
suspect that the physician was engaging in wrongdoing worthy of
violating the patient's privacy rights. Moreover, the patient is not even
given an opportunity to consent to the search, which some patients will
invariably withhold.244 As a result, litigation involving such patients
can expose much of their private and sensitive information.245
Thus, an ideal solution to this issue involves not only providing
procedural protections to patients with prescription records, but also
providing substantive protections. As required by the Fourth
Amendment, courts and state legislatures should provide procedural
protections to patients and potential defendants by requiring law
enforcement agents to obtain warrants to access PDMPs.2 4 6
Substantive protections would involve the redaction of private and
sensitive patient information from prescription records.247
A. Procedural Protections .
First, to both preserve procedural protections and promote
initiatives that combat the opioid crisis, courts should set aside the
third-party doctrine from prescription records.248 This solution would
recognize patients' heightened expectations of privacy and desire for
treatment without unreasonable forfeitures of privacy; however, if an
official has probable cause to believe that a medical professional is
engaging in illegal prescribing practices, that official could still obtain
PDMP records-so long as the official first obtains a valid warrant.
Additionally, officials would retain warrantless access to PDMP records
under truly exigent circumstances.
In the alternative, state legislatures should refrain from
enacting database statutes that allow officials access to PDMP records
without warrants. Instead, states should limit PDMP access to officials
limits on who can look at and receive [their] health information." See Your Rights Under HIPAA,
supra note 242.
244. See Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1015 (Cal. 2017) (describing a situation
where only three out of five patients consented to the release of their full medical records to the
Medical Board of California for an investigation against a physician for excessive prescribing).
245. See infra Sections IV.A, TV.B.
246. See infra Section W.A.
247. See infra Section IV.B.
248. At the time of writing, neither the Supreme Court nor the US Courts of Appeals have
any such cases in their dockets. In the event that respondents from United States Dep't ofJustice
v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, or similarly situated parties from other cases, file an appeal with the
US Courts of Appeals or, later, a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court-the courts should




with valid warrants. Under this alternative solution, courts should
avoid giving deference to federal government officials vis-A-vis the
third-party doctrine. Instead, courts should refer to the provisions of
state database statutes when determining whether the government has
committed a Fourth Amendment violation or has otherwise properly
utilized the appropriate channels for accessing PDMP records. This is
because each state has a unique jurisprudence.249
In the event that a given state database statute allows officials
warrantless access to their respective PDMPs, courts should uphold
decisions that align with the fact that some state laws provide greater
protections to their citizens than the US Constitution.250 Although the
Bill of Rights protects individual privacy, it is not the only law that state
citizens can use for protection.251  Accordingly, some states have
rejected the federal third-party doctrine-thus providing greater
protections to their respective citizens.252 As such, if higher courts and
various state legislatures do not follow the above solutions, lower courts
should-at minimum-act in accordance with state constitutions when
faced with potential third-party exception PDMP litigation.
B. Substantive Protections
Warrants are essential because they provide individuals with
procedural privacy protections.253 However, procedural protections do
not carry the day when it comes to substantive patient privacy. After
all, prescription records often contain secrets about human conditions
concerning mental and physical health, as well as sensitive information
like credit card numbers, Social Security numbers, and more.25 4
Accordingly, when controversies involving prescription records are
brought before a court, the court should require the redaction of such
information.255 Patients can be further protected if redactions are made
before pharmacy employees hand records over to law enforcement. A
cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to determine the party best
suited to oversee such ex ante redactions.256  By providing the
249. See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search,
55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 414 (2006).
250. See id. at 374.
251. See id. at 373-74.
252. See id. at 395-96 (listing states and their dispositions on the third-party doctrine).
253. See supra Sections IA, III.A.2.
254. See Your Rights Under HIPAA, supra note 242; supra Section I.A.3.
255. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5.2(e)(1).
256. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VIcIoUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 20 (1993) (emphasizing the role of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory regimes). The
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aforementioned procedural and substantive safeguards, judges and
lawmakers can better protect patient privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
As it stands, President Trump's public health emergency
declaration does not allow for more warrantless searches. However, an
increase in forceful rhetoric concerning the opioid crisis can encourage
government officials and courts to conduct and uphold warrantless
searches in occasions where states explicitly require warrants.257
United States Dep't of Justice v. Utah Dep't of Commerce is a prime
example.258 Although the Constitution makes no explicit reference to
privacy, the Court has long protected privacy rights by way of
substantive due process.259 That is not to say that the Constitution is
no more than a grant of discretion to the Supreme Court o engage in
judicial activism. Rather, the justices should use substantive due
process to reconsider how the third-party doctrine should be applied, if
at all, in the digital age. In order to ensure that Fourth Amendment
protections are as robust as the Constitution's Framers intended, courts
should limit the outdated third-party doctrine.260 This will not stifle
law enforcement; rather, it will regulate enforcement bodies to ensure
a proper balance of constitutional safeguards and crime control.
Accordingly, the legal system can-and must-keep up with emerging
technologies.
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